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Background: In India a lack of access to emergency obstetric care contributes to maternal deaths. In 2005 Gujarat
state launched a public-private partnership (PPP) programme, Chiranjeevi Yojana (CY), under which the state pays
accredited private obstetricians a fixed fee for providing free intrapartum care to poor and tribal women. A million
women have delivered under CY so far. The participation of private obstetricians in the partnership is central to the
programme’s effectiveness. We explored with private obstetricians the reasons and experiences that influenced their
decisions to participate in the CY programme.
Method: In this qualitative study we interviewed 24 purposefully selected private obstetricians in Gujarat. We
explored their views on the scheme, the reasons and experiences leading up to decisions to participate, not
participate or withdraw from the CY, as well as their opinions about the scheme’s impact. We analysed data using
the Framework approach.
Results: Participants expressed a tension between doing public good and making a profit. Bureaucratic procedures
and perceptions of programme misuse seemed to influence providers to withdraw from the programme or not
participate at all. Providers feared that participating in CY would lower the status of their practices and some were
deterred by the likelihood of more clinically difficult cases among eligible CY beneficiaries. Some providers resented
taking on what they saw as a state responsibility to provide safe maternity services to poor women. Younger
obstetricians in the process of establishing private practices, and those in more remote, ‘less competitive’ areas,
were more willing to participate in CY. Some doctors had reservations over the quality of care that doctors could
provide given the financial constraints of the scheme.
Conclusions: While some private obstetricians willingly participate in CY and are satisfied with its functioning, a
larger number shared concerns about participation. Operational difficulties and a trust deficit between the public
and private health sectors affect retention of private providers in the scheme. Further refinement of the scheme, in
consultation with private partners, and trust building initiatives could strengthen the programme. These findings offer
lessons to those developing public-private partnerships to widen access to health services for underprivileged groups.
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Public-private partnerships are increasingly used in low
and middle income countries (LMICs) to deliver a var-
iety of health care and allied services. Although the
ultimate responsibility of a country’s health system lies
with its government, in countries with a diminished tax
base, there are limits to what states can finance and
achieve alone [1]. It is argued that effective stewardship
implies a key role for governments as one of “oversight
and trusteeship”, where the state “rows less and steers
more” [1]. Collaborative partnerships, in which public
authorities contract out services to the private sector,
have been promoted as a realistic response to resource
scarcity in the public sector in some contexts. In coun-
tries like India, where health care users face a choice be-
tween overstretched public systems or expensive and
unregulated private services, successful public-private
partnerships could harness the strengths and mitigate
deficiencies of each sector. In India, public-private part-
nerships are seen as a pragmatic response to one of the
most highly privatised healthcare systems in the world.
Over two thirds of all health care expenditure is made in
the private sector, mostly out-of-pocket [2,3]. However,
the evidence suggests that while some state partner-
ships with non-governmental organisations, voluntary
organisations or the private for-profit sector have been
successful, evidence remains mixed [4-6]. One reason
for this is the private for-profit sector’s lack of enthu-
siasm for partnership with government, which they
view with a degree of apathy and scepticism [7]. But
owing to its widespread presence across the country,
involvement of this sector is critical for implementation
of Universal Health Care as declared by the Government
of India [8].
Twenty percent of all global maternal deaths occur in
India, and mostly among poor women [9]. Because most
maternal deaths occur in the peripartum period, there is
an assumption that a strategy based on birth in a facility
equipped to provide skilled birth attendance and emer-
gency obstetric care will lead to a reduction in maternal
deaths [10]. In India, the main barrier to giving birth in-
facility among poor women is financial access [11]. Re-
moving financial barriers to facility birth and improving
access to emergency obstetric care (EmOC) is imperative
to reducing maternal deaths.
Health care provision in Gujarat is dominated by the
for-profit private sector which provides most birthing
facilities in the state, usually on a fee-for-service basis,
paid out-of-pocket by the user. Weak obstetric care
provision in the public sector [12] and wide availability
of obstetric care in the private sector led the state
Government to implement a public-private partnership
to encourage poor women to give births in private obstet-
ric care facilities. Chiranjeevi Yojana (CY), or ‘Schemefor Long Life’ was launched in October 2005 to provide
poor women access to emergency obstetric care in the
private sector at no cost [12-14]. CY is a performance-
based financing scheme, where maternity services are
contracted out by the state to private obstetricians accre-
dited on proof of certain criteria, such as providing a
minimum of 15 beds and ready access to anaesthetic
and blood transfusion facilities. The state pays accre-
dited private obstetricians a pre-determined sum to
perform facility births among poor women targeted by
the scheme [12-14]. More than 800 private obstetricians
joined the programme when it started (more than 50%
of the total number of private obstetricians in the state)
and nearly a million poor women have taken advantage
of the scheme [15-17].
Recent evidence suggests Chiranjeevi Yojana is failing
to attract and retain private doctors, with increasing at-
trition of obstetricians from the scheme. In the past five
years, 50% of obstetricians are reported to have with-
drawn their participation [17], yet little is known about
why they have left, or what motivated them to join ini-
tially. Understanding this could lead to improvements
in CY and better design and implementation of future
public-private partnerships for widening access to ser-
vices for underprivileged groups. In this study we explored
the factors influencing private obstetricians’ decisions to
enrol in the CY scheme, reasons behind their willingness
or reluctance to continue, and the reasons why some
choose never to participate at all.
Methods
Study setting
Gujarat is a state in the western part of India with a
population of about 60 million. The percentage of the
population living ‘below poverty line’ (BPL) is 16.7%,
compared with 22% nationally [18], and the tribal popu-
lation comprises 14.8%, with a significant overlap be-
tween these two groups. The Maternal Mortality Ratio
(MMR) in Gujarat was 148 per 100,000 live births for
2007–2009, compared with the national MMR of 212
per 100,000 live births over the same period. Despite
progress since 2004–2006, maternal health indicators in
Gujarat still lag behind some states in the south of the
country, for example Kerala where the MMR was 81 per
100,000 for 2007-2009 [19].
In Gujarat, as in other states in India, there is a
chronic shortage of obstetricians in the public sector,
and particularly in rural areas of the state [12]. Many
factors influence the persistence of this gap, including
low salaries, poor infrastructure, and few incentives for
obstetricians to join government services in rural areas.
Gujarat is more economically developed than other
states, and three quarters of the 2000 registered obstetri-
cians in the state work in the for-profit private sector
Table 1 Participant characteristics
Characteristics District 1 District 2 Total
N = 17 N = 7 N = 24*
Participation status at time of study (%)
Current participant 6 (35.3) 4 (57.1) 10 (41.7)
Discontinued 9 (52.9) 3 (42.9) 12 (50)
Never participated 2 (11.8) 0 (0) 2 (8.3)
Gender
Male 13(76.5) 6(85.7) 19(79.2)
Female 4(23.5) 1(14.3) 5(20.8)
Location
Large town, urban 7(41.2) 5(71.4) 12(50)
Small town, rural 10(58.8) 2(28.6) 12(50)
Age
35 years or less 4(23.5) 2(28.5) 6(25)
More than 35 years 13(76.5) 5(71.5) 18(75)
*Note: Sampling frame.
District 1: Total private obstetricians: 55 (current participant: 16, discontinued:
34, never participated: 5).
District 2: Total private obstetricians: 21 (current participant: 8, discontinued:
12, never participated:1).
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large and growing private health sector, a poorly func-
tioning government sector, and a substantial proportion
of the population eligible for social welfare programmes,
an innovative scheme to co-opt the private sector to pro-
vide delivery care and access to emergency care seemed
like a reasonable approach [12].
Participants
The study was carried out in two purposively selected
districts of Gujarat which were part of a larger parent
study (MATIND), which recorded every facility conduct-
ing births in the two districts using GPS mapping. From
this wider study, we had access to a comprehensive sam-
pling frame of private practitioners. Each district is an
independent administrative unit within the state, with an
average population of two million. District 1 is more
tribal (more than 20% of population) and less urban
(11% of population), and district 2 is less tribal (1% of
population) and more urban (27% population). The pro-
portion of population without any work is marginally
higher in district 2 [20].
From our comprehensive sampling frame, we selected
facilities offering childbirth services within the two dis-
tricts [21]. Study participants were qualified obstetricians
whose facilities were eligible to participate in the CY
scheme (able to perform Caesarean sections and trans-
fuse blood). We selected obstetricians to capture vari-
ation in age, sex, location and their CY participation
status (practitioners currently participating in the CY
scheme, those who had discontinued their participation,
and those who had never participated at all). Efforts
were made to obtain a sample with a wide range of prac-
titioner characteristics in order to identify what central,
shared experiences around participation are common to
each group, as well as areas of difference. Shortlisted pri-
vate practicing obstetricians were identified and invited
for interview by phone; they were informed of the pur-
pose of the interview and estimated time required. Per-
mission was sought to audio record the interviews and
confidentiality was assured. Only three of those invited
could not give us a suitable time for interview. We con-
tinued to interview until no new information was forth-
coming, and reached saturation at 24 participants. This
number represents about a third of the total eligible par-
ticipants in these two districts (Table 1).
Data collection process
We used semi-structured interviews to open up discussion
about the obstetricians’ understanding of the scheme, their
experiences of the CY scheme and what influenced them
to participate, drop out, or never to participate at all, as
well as their opinions about the scheme’s impact. The re-
searcher arranged a mutually convenient time to interviewthose who agreed to participate; interviews were carried
out at the obstetricians’ own facilities between July and
September 2012. We piloted the interview with three doc-
tors and made minor modifications to the topic guides.
The first author of this paper (PG) conducted all inter-
views in a combination of the three languages commonly
in use in Gujarat – Gujarati, Hindi, or English. On average
the interviews took 40 minutes each, and were audio
recorded; four interviewees did not wish to have their
interviews recorded, so detailed notes were taken. The
positionality of the interviewer (PG) was important in es-
tablishing a good rapport with the respondents; he is a
physician with many years’ experience of working in close
association with both private and government health sec-
tors in Gujarat.
Data analysis
A research assistant, present at each interview, tran-
scribed all interview data and translated it into English
for uniformity and the first author (PG) cross-checked a
sample for accuracy. We used the Framework approach,
a matrix-based method for ordering and synthesising
data, to analyse the qualitative data [22]. Framework ana-
lysis is best suited to applied qualitative research, where
the intention is to present themes identified in the data
rather than develop or contribute to theory. PG coded all
transcripts using a coding index based on concepts iden-
tified after reading and re-reading the transcripts. The
team (PG, KJ, ADC and HS) discussed the initial group-
ing of the coded data into categories of related data, and
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through rounds of discussion. We frequently referred
back to the raw data and used matrices containing data
for each theme to help us identify similarities and differ-
ences across the different types of providers, age groups
and gender.
Ethical approval
This study has ethical approval from the Institutional
Ethics Committee (IEC) of the Indian Institute of Public
Health Gandhinagar. Written informed consent was ob-
tained from those who agreed to be interviewed. Partici-
pant responses were anonymised during the analysis.
Results
All of the obstetricians who participated in the study
were owners of small private health facilities where they,
as owner-doctors, made all decisions relating to clinical,
technical, financial and administrative activities. Most
practices we visited had 10–15 beds, and the main ob-
stetrician employed both qualified and unqualified staff
to work at the facility. More obstetricians were inter-
viewed in district 1 due to the larger size of that district’s
sampling frame and larger numbers of practising private
obstetricians. The total number of obstetricians in dis-
trict 1 was 55 compared with 21 in district 2, as mapped
by the MATIND study team. Only two providers in our
sample had ‘never participated’ in the scheme, and this
could be due to the intense enrolment campaign across
the state and political support the scheme enjoyed at the
time it was launched. The gender distribution of our
participants reflects the gender composition of obstetri-
cians in Gujarat; there are fewer women obstetricians in
the state (Table 1).
We identified six main themes that help to explain pri-
vate practitioner decisions to participate in the CY scheme,
the important influences on their decision making, and
their experiences of participating in the scheme.
Why should I participate? Tension between doing good
for the public and making a profit
Private practitioners discussed at length the competing
demands of providing a ‘public service’ to poor women,
while at the same time needing to run a practice to
make a profit. All the private practitioners we inter-
viewed referred to making a significant initial investment
in their practice and the expectation that this would
translate into a reasonable profit:
“Private [practice] is totally different. When someone
has invested Rs. 7 million, he will try to make more
money instead of getting involved in a loss making
proposition. It is a business for him.” (Past participant,
rural, male)At the same time many respondents, both currently
participating and past participant groups, recognised
and expressed the moral responsibility of a doctor to serve
the poor. Private sector obstetricians claimed to work to
their own kind of moral code, one which they believed
would operate even in the absence of such schemes. They
said it was common for them to treat poor patients and
charge them less. As one doctor from an urban area who
had discontinued participating in the scheme, claimed,
‘even when this scheme did not exist, almost every one of
us was considering poor people’.
Some of the obstetricians, mostly in rural areas and
currently participating in the scheme, commented that
they were pleased that they could provide services free
of charge to poor women while they themselves received
reasonable fees through the scheme. A typical comment
was that through the scheme doctors get paid by the
government, but also get satisfaction of serving ‘poor
people free of cost’.
Younger obstetricians observed a clear economic benefit
to their participation in the scheme, particularly in the
early stages of establishing their practice. One urban doctor
who no longer participated in the scheme was certain that
‘new practitioners should definitely take [up] the scheme’.
Others described how the scheme allowed them to launch
their practices:
“As a new comer I had enrolled into the scheme, and
it helped me in my practice in the initial stage.”
(Current participant, urban, male)
“We were struggling hard in our private practice
and we got the chance, and it was the good chance
to join the practice and to highlight ourselves […]
Definitely benefited us to get name and fame.”
(Current participant, rural, female)
Private doctors from smaller towns felt that CY made
more business sense in provincial or remote locations
than in bigger cities:
“The payment (Rs 2,800) what we get in CY is
sufficient as the usual charge for normal delivery
here is similar. In bigger cities, charges are around
Rs10,000, so Rs 2,800 is very less for them.” (Current
participant, rural, male)
In spite of the scheme’s popularity among some youn-
ger practitioners, the majority of private obstetricians
we talked to said the scheme was not economically vi-
able, as the remuneration was inadequate, and it did
not increase the volume of patients sufficiently to reap
the benefits of ‘economy of scale’. One current partici-
pant in an urban area described his disappointment at
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he had thought that the ‘flow of patients would in-
crease’. Other past participants also thought the scheme
would ‘increase in the number of deliveries, patients
will come to a private set up (facility), and we will get
more work’.
In addition to disappointment over the volume of new
patients the scheme would bring, a common concern
was inadequate remuneration for complicated deliveries,
such as those requiring blood transfusion or Caesarean
section:
“From this amount of Rs 2,800, medicines will cost us
1,000, anaesthesia cost 1,500. Hence doctor doesn’t get
a single penny. That is why C.S. [Caesarean section] is
not preferable to the doctor.” (Current participant,
rural, female)
Providers suggested that the cost of blood transfusion
should be reimbursed separately, and that the Caesarean
section rate calculated in the package should comprise
at least 15–25% of total deliveries:
“Amount of Rs 2,800 for normal [delivery] is alright
but for C-Section it is quite less. Moreover C-Section
rate is much higher [than 7% as calculated in CY] in
private practice - around 20-30%.” (Current participant,
urban, male)
The disappointing volume of patients and the bundled
remuneration for Caesarean sections and vaginal de-
liveries together meant that many obstetricians strug-
gled with their (purported) desire to deliver a public
good and their profit-making motives. As a consequence,
a number of currently participating obstetricians’ spoke
of this unresolved tension; those who had left the scheme
cited it as a key reason why they were no longer partici-
pating in the scheme.
Procedural burden discourages participation
Most doctors (current and former participants) com-
plained of the scheme presenting a procedural burden
to their daily practice. Past participants commented on
the opportunity cost of engaging in the ‘considerable
amount of paperwork involved to secure reimbursement’
and described long delays in getting the reimburse-
ment. Both these factors appeared to be major reasons
why some respondents discontinued their participa-
tion in CY:
“Initially there was no problem, but later on the
clerical work started increasing, so it was difficult to
perform.” (Past participant, urban, male)“When a pregnant lady comes to me for delivery, should
I focus on saving the mother [and the baby] or on
completing the form [documents]?” (Past participant,
rural, male)
A mistrust of the government health sector was evi-
dent in the way practitioners described their experiences
of dealing with the local government authorities for re-
imbursement under CY. For example:
“We have to give so many calls to them to get the
payment. We have to meet them 2 to 3 times and I
should go by myself to get the payment.” (Current
participant, urban, male)
“When we go to the block office to get our payment,
then the clerk behaves in such a way that [as if] he
himself has to arrange payment from his pocket.
They start picking up mistakes.” (Past participant,
rural, male)
For one doctor, a past participant working in an urban
area, payment received for his services provided under
CY came very late. On the day we interviewed him he
remarked: ‘I got last year's payment [the] day before yes-
terday only’. When doctors sense such risks to their in-
come, they may be tempted to compromise quality when
treating CY patients as compensation. As an obstetrician
who has never participated in the scheme remarked:
“If the payment is less, quality gets compromised;
disposables [may not be] used, low quality sutures
used.” (Never participated, urban, male)
One formerly participating obstetrician spoke of the
positive outcome for his practice after discontinuing
from CY:
“Paperwork got reduced and income also [no longer]
affected.” (Past participant, rural, male)
Overall, perceived procedural burdens and delays were
a considerable disincentive to continue or embark on
participation in the scheme.
Misuse of the scheme
The perceived misuse of CY by patients, health workers,
government figures and other obstetricians alike was
cited as a significant deterrent to private practitioners’
willingness to participate in the scheme. Almost all the
obstetricians interviewed in both districts expressed
their concern over misuse of the scheme by families they
perceived as non-poor. According to the private ob-
stetricians, many families who are not eligible manage
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poverty line) status from certifying authorities:
“Many people who can afford the cost come as ‘BPL’,
but they have mobile, bikes, cars and everything […]
All such persons are bringing [poverty] certificates
from Talati [revenue office].” (Current participant,
rural, male)
“People come in their Toyota car and show BPL
cards.” (Past participant, rural, male)
Moreover, many practitioners who had dropped out of
the scheme told us that as misuse of CY by non-BPL
women increased, they started to face a loss of revenue.
This situation arose when the same clients who used
to pay fees came in with appropriate BPL certification
allowing them to access care for free:
“Yes, as I have told you, the ones who were well off,
started coming in the private hospitals pretending to
be BPL […]”
[Interviewer] “The same people who used to come and
used to make a payment?”
“Yes, and now they bring the BPL card and we started
facing a loss.” (Past participant, rural, male)
Another doctor concurred that the same was happen-
ing in urban facilities:
“Same people who paid for first delivery now comes as
BPL […] We lose earning. So you know when you feel
that you are being cheated.” (Past participant,
urban, male)
Obstetricians were concerned about this ‘unfair pro-
cedure’ and considered it wasteful expenditure of gov-
ernment funds, diverting services from eligible families
who actually need it.
Another source of discontent among the private obste-
tricians was what they considered the unfair means
adopted by some of their fellow colleagues to profit per-
sonally from the scheme. A number of respondents de-
scribed obstetricians paying community healthworkers
to bring more patients to their hospitals. Respondents
claimed that this included both ambulance drivers (of
the state-supported 108 service) and Accredited Social
Health Activists (ASHAs - voluntary community health
workers paid an incentive to accompany poor women to
facilities for hospital births). Conversely, providers gave
examples of how some community health workers ex-
pected payment or favours from private practitioners forbringing women to the clinic. Providers we interviewed
claimed:
“Then Government promoted 108 [the ambulance
service], and they [some private obstetricians] started
pampering [bribing] 108 people.” (Past participant,
rural, male)
“One ASHA offered me a CY form and said, ‘This lady
has undergone home delivery, can you include her in
your CY list [as institutional delivery for getting the
payment]?” (Past participant, urban, female)
“ASHAs bring patients and expect some amount in
return from us. I don’t entertain, so they send patients
to other doctors who may do so.” (Current participant,
urban, male)
There was also evidence that some providers registered
with CY exploit the scheme by accepting uncomplicated
obstetric cases only. Practitioners located in rural as well as
urban areas admitted that they tend to avoid accepting
women who arrive late and with complications under CY,
choosing instead to ‘push’ or ‘shift’ (i.e. refer) these cases to
hospitals run by the government or charitable trusts. The
reason commonly given for referring these women was
that remuneration under CY is insufficient to cover the
cost of blood transfusions or anaesthetist charges:
“A CY patient comes to me with complication which
needs C-Section. I am paid only Rs 2,800. You just tell
me, can I manage it with this amount? No. So – there
is a trend to…‘shift’. I will push that patient to
somewhere else.” (Past participant, rural, male)
“Now as both types of delivery [normal and Caesarean
section] have the same [remuneration] rate in the
scheme, all the doctors try to go for normal delivery.
Hence, neo-natal deaths are occurring more because
of the long trial for normal delivery resulting in
delay and foetal distress. This is a routine.” (Current
participant, rural, female)
Practitioners we interviewed also referred to misuse of
the scheme by government workers. Private practitioners
in urban and rural areas (both currently enrolled in CY
and those who had dropped out), expressed displeasure
at being placed under pressure from ‘influential (public)
persons’ to accept their family members under the CY
scheme. In most cases these requests were for individ-
uals who were not eligible for CY, or who were not able
to produce the necessary documents. Typically, practi-
tioners explained they would receive a phone call to
accept a particular woman and conduct the birth for free,
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‘may create some problem’. Others believed they should
not be ‘pressurised’ by the government authorities to
accept their relatives under CY.
Related to their interactions with government officials,
many practitioners in both districts, including current
participants and those who had dropped out, described
what they perceived sometimes as rude, uncooperative
behaviour. Some of them also mentioned wilful delay at
block level to make payments. One obstetrician said that
some doctors are ‘giving [a] cut [a proportion of the pay-
ment to local officials] […] this should never happen’.
Another went so far as to argue that without ‘some gratifi-
cation’ to the system, working in the programme could be
difficult. Officials could ‘pick up on mistakes’ for example,
where forms were not filled out completely, and use this as
a reason for delaying payment to the obstetrician.
Going downmarket: participation in CY is perceived to
lower private facilities’ status
In general, obstetricians who had a higher professional
status (senior and established), social status (located in
bigger cities than in remote areas) or financial status
(charging higher fees) were less keen to participate in this
scheme, which they felt was primarily a ‘poor people’s
scheme’. As one senior obstetrician, a former participant
from a rural area explained:
“My charges are on higher side; Rs 4,000 in normal
[delivery] and 8,000-10,000 for C-S [Caesarean section].
So CY is difficult for me.” (Past participant, rural, male)
By drawing attention to his high fees, this obstetrician
hints at what he sees as the incompatibility of his prac-
tice’s clientele with CY. Another former participant in
an urban area seemed pleased that the status of his pa-
tients has changed since leaving CY:
“Now, I am getting good socio-economically upper class
people; when I was in CY, I used to get a lot of poor
and village people.” (Past participant, urban, male)
A younger, rural doctor explained that doctors in big-
ger cities were concerned about having to serve a poorer
socioeconomic class of clients of CY as they thought that
this might downgrade the image of their facility and
deter ‘higher class’ patients who the providers said were
the main source of income for them:
“In bigger cities, certain hospitals have a stigma that
they will not take this type of patient as they think
that if such patients [CY beneficiaries] come to their
hospital, the crowd of higher status patients will get
[negatively] affected.” (Current participant, rural, male)The significance of status to doctors’ participation is
also linked to peer decision-making. We observed that
the decision of private obstetricians to either continue or
discontinue their enrolment in the CY was greatly influ-
enced by decisions taken by their peer group through the
local branch of their professional body FOGSI (Federation
of Obstetric and Gynaecological Society of India). In some
towns, where the local branch of FOGSI had decided not
to support the scheme, we found that almost all obstetri-
cians had discontinued participation, whereas in other
towns, almost all were continuing their participation:
“Yes, I also think at times to leave this scheme but I
am in this scheme just because of the competition,
otherwise I would have left it because I have lost
interest in it.”
[Interviewer]: “Competition means which type of
competition?”
“Competition in the sense, see we have 10 to 12
gynaecologists in the same area, and three to four
doctors have continued this scheme and other four
have discontinued. So just to get more patients [not
losing patients to them who continue enrolment in CY]
we have continued to participate in this scheme.”
(Current participant, urban, male)
Participating unwillingly: private sector perception of
being coerced into taking on state responsibility
We found that private practitioners’ lack of trust in the
government system adversely influenced the principle of
partnership between government and private sector in CY.
It was apparent in almost all the interviews across the three
categories of respondents (those who were currently par-
ticipants, past participants and had never participated).
The providers were united in their opinion that rather than
making government health staff and facilities accountable
for maternal health services, the CY scheme ‘tends to pass
on this responsibility to the private sector’. In addition, it
was their view that private practitioners ‘shoulder the risk
of providing these services’ with no additional legal protec-
tion provided by the government in case they are faced
with maternal deaths or severe complications. This seemed
to influence participation in the scheme, with some doctors
dropping out and others avoiding complicated cases, be-
cause they felt they would expose themselves to potential
litigation without any government support:
“Complicated cases are avoided by us because if
there is any mortality then it becomes very difficult
for any doctor. Government has told us that it is our
responsibility to tackle those matters; whether it is
criminal, civil or consumer. Only the burden is on
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rural, female)
“I don’t take complicated CY cases because of fear that
I will be held responsible if any unwanted things
happen. Whole responsibility comes on us only.
Government should give full protection in case of
complications.” (Past participant, rural, male)
Older practitioners and those who had dropped out of
the scheme were critical of what they perceived as un-
warranted government enquiries into private practices
under the CY scheme, and the negative publicity this
could involve. They commented that the government
seemed ‘suspicious’ of private practices, and were quick
to report any malpractice or misconduct, yet ignored the
irregularities in government hospitals:
“Government does not bother for mistakes done by
Government staff but in case of private doctors they
are very strict. They are always suspicious about
private doctors.” (Past participant, urban, female)
“Some colleagues faced enquiries - demoralising and
bad for social and professional reputation.” (Never
participated, urban, male)
Many practitioners perceived there to be an association
between participation in CY and their vulnerability under
the Pre-Natal Sex Determination Techniques (PNDT) Act.
The act is in place to prevent female foeticide which is a
major social problem leading to a disproportionate sex ra-
tio in the population. Under the act, obstetricians are for-
bidden to tell parents the sex of the child during an
ultrasound examination. Obstetricians feared that if they
did not participate in CY, government officials would ac-
cuse them of violating the PNDT Act, or not grant them
registration to carry out ultrasound examinations. Not
surprisingly, practitioners who had dropped out of the
scheme were more willing to talk about this, whereas
those remaining in the scheme raised the same issues
but were more guarded in their descriptions:
“They told, ‘You have to join otherwise we will not give
you registration for sonography’…yes it was [a] threat,
by the Collector.” (Past participant, rural, male)
“Government people keep us threatened that action
may be taken against us in the pretext of some
irregularity in PNDT.” (Past Participant, urban, male)
Participation in CY perceived as a risk by the private sector
Another theme we identified in the data, which is closely
linked to other risks raised by the participants, is theirperception of the clinical risks associated with participating
in the scheme. There was a clear sense that clinically diffi-
cult cases cluster in CY because of the socioeconomic back-
ground of the beneficiaries, and this deterred providers
from participating. Private practitioners in rural areas in
particular felt that CY beneficiaries as a group are at much
higher risk of complications, as they are often highly an-
aemic, malnourished and multiparous. For example, this
urban practitioner, a past participant, explained:
“There are differences between BPL and APL
[Above Poverty Line] patients. Complications are
high among BPL patients - anaemia, sepsis, unhygienic
conditions. Anaemia is a big problem indeed.” (Past
participant, urban, female)
Obstetricians commented that CY beneficiaries often
arrive late to the facility, already in established labour.
At the same time, few BPL patients attend free antenatal
care. Without knowing the detailed history of the preg-
nant women, practitioners were of the view that they are
unable to anticipate complications, or prevent them by
treating underlying causes such as anaemia or malnutri-
tion. As two past participants from rural areas stated:
“Three to four ANC [antenatal care visits] is a must,
but most patients don't come for ANC; [they] directly
come for delivery.” (Past participant, rural, male)
“Here people receive two TT [Tetanus Toxoid] from
the sister (community worker) and think their ANC is
finished.” (Past participant, rural, female)
The pressures placed by a large volume of high risk
patients led some obstetricians to question the ability of
doctors to offer sufficient quality care. Several practitioners
raised concerns about the quality of care for women during
delivery at private facilities participating in the scheme,
with one provider confident that, under such circum-
stances ‘there are some people who compromise quality’.
Some of the older practitioners we interviewed (those who
had dropped out or had never participated), suggested
that many clinical procedures including delivery were
conducted not by the doctor, but by ‘unqualified staff ’
in many private hospitals. This was perceived not as a de-
liberate misuse of the scheme, but as a response to re-
source shortages:
“How a private practitioner can manage himself to see
100 patients, do 5–7 deliveries with 1–2 C-Sections in
a day? In reality, s/he entrusts 5–6 nonqualified person
(trained by him/her) to do a lot of things, including
deliveries. So, where is the quality?” (Past participant,
rural, male)
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egories (participating, dropped out and never partici-
pated in CY) stated that the Caesarean section rate is
relatively high in private practice because it is the prefer-
ence of the practitioner to do elective surgery in cases
with complications. Private obstetricians said that they
usually avoid a trial of normal labour and delivery as it
increases the chance of emergency Caesarean delivery,
which is always challenging in single doctor practices
without ready availability of blood and an anaesthetist:
“Now here we are, single handed practitioner, and
without teamwork; to tackle such emergency is
difficult.” (Past participant, urban, male)
“In private practice it is difficult to tackle emergency
C-section as blood, and an anaesthetist may not be
readily available.” (Past participant, urban, male)
Discussion
In this study we have documented, through carefully
conducted interviews, some of the factors that have in-
fluenced private obstetricians’ decisions to participate,
not participate or withdraw from a state led private sec-
tor initiative to increase institutional deliveries among
poor women in Gujarat state. Providers still participat-
ing, and those who recently dropped out spoke about a
tension between doing public good and making a profit.
They expressed a need to balance altruism with entre-
preneurship, and were disappointed when the scheme
did not yield an increase in new patients, or provide suf-
ficient remuneration for complicated deliveries. On the
other hand providers told us that informally they feel
they do behave charitably towards poor patients regard-
less of the scheme, by treating poor women in their
practices and charging them less. Besides the procedural
burden associated with participation in the scheme, our
findings show that eligible practitioners are discouraged
from participating because they perceive that accepting
poor women as clients will damage the reputation of
their facility, and that dealing with the clinical complica-
tions associated with this group of women was too much
of a risk. We also identified a lack of trust between the
private and public sector, with private practitioners scep-
tical of the rationale for participating in the scheme, and
deterred by the potential and real misuse of the scheme
by non-eligible families.
Why do private practitioners enrol and continue their
participation in the CY scheme?
Some of the obstetricians’ claims of a personal ‘moral
code’ driving them to participate and to provide public
services to the poor has been noted in another small
study in Gujarat state (Ranjan P: A study on factorsfor and against participation in the Chiranjeevi scheme
by private sector obstetricians, unpublished). This self-
declared motivation of altruism is consistent with the
ethical code of the Indian Medical Act, to which all
Indian doctors are required to adhere [23]. At the same
time however, they described a parallel incentive in join-
ing the scheme: wanting to build a business, or establish
their reputation. This derives from a different kind of
motivation, where health care services are viewed as a
‘market good’ [24]. Other reports on the CY scheme also
describe a similar observation [13]. From this viewpoint,
the provision of health care is an entrepreneurial activity,
arguably a view that runs counter to current policy em-
phasis in India of Universal Health Coverage [25]. With
India’s health system in financial crisis, current debate
asks how realistic this notion of ‘health as a public good’
is, or even how ‘Indian’ [26]. Rather than second guess
practitioners’ ‘true’ motivations, our concern here is
whether private obstetricians’ and the state’s interests
overlap with regard to the CY. With any public-private
partnership, it is not necessary that partners share exactly
the same interests, only that at some point they converge
to make participation for both an attractive prospect.
While the state’s interest was to increase access to birth
in a private facility for poor women, a part of the private
obstetric sector saw the programme as a means to build
their own practices, increase patient volumes in their fa-
cility and so were motivated to join the programme as
they had a shared interest with the state in implementing
the CY. Not all providers shared this motivation, but it is
likely that those who did were more likely to join and re-
main in the programme.
Why have private practitioners left the scheme,
or never joined?
The doctors interviewed voiced a number of complaints
which they claimed left them dissatisfied and prompted
their withdrawal, or deterred them from ever participat-
ing. Chief amongst these was the notion that the scheme
is not economically viable. Insufficient remuneration for
complicated deliveries was cited as a key cause, with a
flat-rate pricing structure (covering an estimated per-
centage of Caesarean sections) unpopular with many
doctors. Based on evidence that differential pricing
structures cause inflation in Caesarean sections [27,28],
the scheme designers attempted to embed this disincen-
tive for unnecessary surgical intervention. According to
doctors interviewed in this study, this is likely to be at
root of much provider attrition. Other authors also argue
that though the remuneration package was decided in
consultation with different stakeholders [12], private
providers did not clearly understand the concept of re-
muneration based on a fixed fee for 100 deliveries, in-
stead thinking in terms of each individual case [29]. The
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in Chiranjeevi [30], though the impact of this on attracting
doctors back to the scheme is not yet clear. As our study
findings suggest that the scheme is most popular with two
main groups of doctors – those starting out in practice and
needing to establish a reputation, and those in rural areas
with little competition – it is probably more efficient for
the scheme to target specific groups of doctors within the
private sector, where there is a clear convergence of state
and private sector interests.
Another reason doctors withdrew from CY was the
amount of paperwork and procedural burden generated
by the scheme. Key issues for attention here concern how
to balance the need to monitor such schemes, whilst
streamlining the paperwork and reducing perceived bur-
eaucracy. The systems deployed by other schemes such as
the Indian government’s Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana
(RSBY), which some respondents seemed to prefer to CY,
need to be explored [31].
A unique observation in our study is a pattern of dis-
continuation; in some towns a large number of private
obstetricians had dropped out of the CY scheme, and in
others a large majority remained enrolled. A possible ex-
planation for this is that the decision to continue or dis-
continue was taken as a group, rather than by individual
practitioners. Practitioners told us that participation is
discussed in the local branch of the professional body
(FOGSI) and a uniform decision is often taken to discon-
tinue from CY. This was apparently driven by business
sense and financial profits. Unless all the obstetricians of
the town discontinued en masse, there was a chance that
individual practices could lose out to those practitioners
still enrolled. This process of joint decision-making should
be taken into account at the planning, promotion and im-
plementation phases of such schemes.
The providers’ misgivings about bureaucracy are closely
linked to the lack of trust the private providers perceive in
their dealings with the government. Providers voiced con-
cerns about the power balance within the partnership, and
the notion that the government monitors the private sec-
tor much more closely than it monitors itself. Concern
about contract management and scheme monitoring by
government officials was mentioned in another study [29].
This sense of asymmetrical power sharing breeds feelings
of resentment from the private doctors and fuels mutual
suspicion and mistrust. Feelings that the private sector is
thus the ‘little partner’ are compounded by the doctors’
sense that the public sector might be shirking responsibil-
ity (and landing the private sector with all the risk). Trust
is further eroded by the perceived threat that some
government officials use the PNDT act to coerce pro-
viders to participate in the scheme. In addressing the
trust in a public-private partnership, the difficulty lies
in achieving the balance between the need for somegovernment control, and the need for trust. Other litera-
ture has mentioned that the sharing of vision, values and
an atmosphere of trust are key factors for any successful
partnership [7].
Reported widespread misuses of the scheme–by target
beneficiaries, workers in the health system, government
officials and by obstetricians themselves–further discour-
aged obstetricians from participating in CY. Many prac-
titioners claimed to find a drop in their revenue when a
large number of (previously fee-paying) clients began
claiming free services under the scheme, and others gave
examples of non-poor persons holding legal poverty
certificates, which they used to access scheme benefits.
Though intangible, trust is important and its presence or
absence has tangible results. Building societal trust is
likely to begin to tackle corrupt use of such schemes.
Senior obstetricians in bigger cities, with higher fees and
serving ‘higher class’ clientele, who considered themselves
‘high profile’ providers, were concerned with the lack of
business sense in the scheme, and felt it somewhat below
their ‘status’ to treat poorer patients. Their apprehension,
that higher class clients (a source of major income to
them) may dislike visiting their facility alongside CY pa-
tients, discouraged their participation in the scheme. By
contrast, the smaller town obstetricians, with lower fees
and no such sense of stigma about CY clients, did not
share this view. This observation in our study is in con-
trast to earlier suggested findings that CY was perceived
by senior providers as a charitable venture, rather than a
PPP [32]. It again points to the need for more targeted
promotion of the scheme among suitable providers.
This need for targeted promotion extends to another
serious concern, that obstetricians sometimes find ways
to maximise profits out of the reimbursement package,
some actively avoiding complicated cases which require
more costly delivery, blood transfusion or longer hos-
pital stays. Other research has also highlighted this profit
maximising behaviour among private providers, and
‘cherry picking’ of uncomplicated cases [29,32]. The re-
sult is that high risk cases are passed back to the public
sector or in any case, moved out of the programme.
Other cost cutting measures reported included using
inferior equipment, supplies and medication as well as
inducing ASHAs or 108 ambulance staff to bring more
eligible women to their practice. Together, these profit
maximising activities all have an impact on the quality
of care that women receive at private facilities enrolled
in CY. Ultimately, encouraging women to give birth in
facilities under these circumstances is unlikely to reduce
maternal and neonatal morbidity and mortality.
This raises questions over the danger of poor women
‘falling through a gap’, either receiving poor quality care
from CY providers dissatisfied with their remuneration,
being turned away from providers disinterested in joining
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quality provision in a struggling public sector. This would
negate the purpose of CY, which is to enable poor women
to access functioning maternity services. The threat of this
vision underlines the importance of making this scheme
and others like it attractive to private providers, which pol-
icymakers and scheme designers can do, by examining the
causes of attrition from PPPs such as these. The recom-
mendations we draw from this study from which similar
schemes and interventions could benefit are several, and
are reiterated here.
One, such schemes must be streamlined and devoid of
lengthy bureaucratic procedures that waste providers’
time (this includes timely repayment schedules). Two,
the reimbursement package must be attractive enough
to providers to enable them to run their businesses and
provide quality services, without fears of failing to do
the former compromising the latter. Three, time and re-
sources spent attempting to coerce reluctant providers
into joining the scheme is wasted, resulting in half-
hearted delivery of services. As our study found in this
context, junior doctors starting out in their practice and
doctors in rural areas (who face less competition for
patients) find the scheme more suited to their aims and
objectives, and are more likely to deliver the scheme sat-
isfactorily. Four, the potential for misuse of the scheme
by beneficiaries and others (which repels providers’
participation) must be minimised. The thorny issue of
misuse can be approached through improved targeting,
though there is, as yet, no panacea to preventing corrup-
tion from all stakeholders involved in schemes such as
these. Five, more transparency between sectors is re-
quired to build trust, which is critical for any partnership
to work; schemes similar to CY need to establish good
relationships between public and private sectors. This
would enable strong governance and allow the state to
monitor and regulate partners, without resistance or
suspicion on either side. Poor leadership, weak contracts
and poor monitoring are significant threats to the success
of programmes such as this. The need for trust relates to
six – the perceived need among providers for some form
of risk-sharing in serving higher risk patients. The per-
ception that difficult cases cluster around CY and that
little protection is offered for private providers in the
scheme was an important concern, and is a disincentive
for providers to join. As this is a partnership, it is not un-
reasonable to expect some of the risk to be shared, which
would improve attrition rates according to providers
interviewed in this study.
Lastly, the existence of PPPs does not preclude efforts
to strengthen the public sector; a strong public sector
remains a key goal in India’s vision for universal health
coverage. PPPs, while imperfect, can be regarded as an
interim measure to provide a safe birth environment forpoor women. Where public sector provision has failed
to deliver safe services and shows little sign of doing so
soon, who delivers the services should be less important
than how, and how well, they are delivered.
Strengths and limitations
We conducted interviews in just two districts of Gujarat
state, but these were carefully chosen to allow us to ex-
plore the views of private practitioners in a rural and an
urban context. Our study was conducted as part of a lar-
ger programme of work funded by the EU, which included
comprehensive GPS mapping of private practitioners in
the state. This enabled us to confidently select from this
list of qualified obstetricians, those whose facilities were
eligible to participate in the CY scheme. We selected ob-
stetricians carefully to include men and women of differ-
ent ages and participation status (practitioners currently
participating in the CY scheme, those who had discontin-
ued their participation, and those who had never par-
ticipated at all). Based on the principle of maximum
variation, this sample allowed us to identify the central,
shared experiences around participation common to each
group, as well as areas of difference. We also selected re-
spondents from different geographical areas: those which
were larger and urban, smaller and urban, predominantly
rural, peripheral, remote and/or tribal to gain a wide
range of contexts. Another strength is that the principle
investigator who conducted the interviews in this study
is a practising public health physician with experience
working in the public and private sector in Gujarat state;
this positionality allowed him to quickly establish rap-
port, generate discussion, and gather in-depth and frank
accounts of the CY scheme.
When designing the study, we anticipated that pro-
viders would refuse to be interviewed or allow interviews
to be audio recorded, due to concerns about confiden-
tiality. Fortunately, only three obstetricians we con-
tacted did not agree to the interview, primarily due to
time constraints, and only two respondents interviewed
expressed some reservation about recording. These par-
ticipants made a few comments ‘off the record’ at the end
of the interview, which were noted down by the interview
team. We feel that overall quality of the data has not been
compromised. An important point to observe in studies
such as these however is the potential for social desirabil-
ity bias, particularly where providers discuss their self-
declared altruism. We cannot discount the possibility of
such bias entirely and we have taken this into account
into our analysis.
Conclusion
Exploring private practitioners’ views of the CY scheme,
the scheme’s functioning, and its ability to increase ac-
cess to CEmOC among the poor and tribal populations
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share some common concerns about participating in this
performance-based financing scheme. The retention of
private providers is compromised by procedural and re-
muneration problems, leading providers to perceive it as
an unprofitable proposition. Procedural burden coupled
with misuse of the scheme at different levels of the
health system prompted private providers to feel dissat-
isfied with their participation in the scheme. Some doc-
tors had concerns about the quality and accountability
that could be provided under the financial constraints of
the scheme. The data from this study suggest that an
emphasis on strong contractual agreements which are
well-monitored by the state and allow better negotiation
with private providers would increase success of the
scheme. The scheme is under review by the state gov-
ernment and these findings could help improve its de-
sign and likelihood of impact on maternal and neonatal
mortality and morbidity.
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